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A reliable and an efficient power system is a necessity for any industrialized society. Governments have to
enforce regulations to guarantee that such a power system, in spite of many competing stakeholders,
participants, companies, and regulating agencies can be operational. This paper analyzes the present
arrangements and the future requirements to be posed on incentives and regulation for ancillary services
(AS) for power balancing. The paper proposes companies to assess their own needs for AS. A two-sided
market for AS is being described to replace the existing arrangements for secondary control. The proposed
solution guarantees a reliable and efficient operation of power systems in a market environment with
responsive, reliable, and accountable but also competing prosumers, a large penetration of less-predictable
renewables and continent-spanning transmission networks. Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words: ancillary services; control of power systems; primary control; secondary control; price-based
control; two-sided market1. INTRODUCTION
The European electric power system experiences a fundamental change in the quasi-monopolistic, top-
down oriented, stable, and reasonably well-predictable arrangements of the past. It now spans
continents, has hundreds of millions consumers and hundreds of thousands of producers, from nuclear
power plants to privately owned and operated badly predictable renewables such as solar cells, wind
and microturbines, and operates in an increasingly liberalized market. These developments pose huge
challenges to ensure reliable and economic operation. This paper focuses on the real-time power
imbalance in the power net, which arises as a consequence of errors in the prediction of both production
and demand. As these fluctuations in power imbalance will increase both in size and in frequency,
present arrangements to cope with this imbalance are inadequate. This paper proposes a two-sided
market and a price-based control framework for ancillary services (AS) (reserve capacity) which
allows a more intelligent solution by giving consumers and producers clear, real-time financial
incentives to adapt their consumption/production according to the actual needs of the power system.
We assume that there are sufficient incentives and proper arrangements for creating and extending
the infrastructure, that there are transparent and open markets for day-ahead trading of energy based on
predictions of available power sources and demand. These markets are based on Balance Responsible
Parties (BRP) which are the only entities that are allowed and capable to trade on these markets. As
such they are reliable and accountable for their operations, so trustworthy partners. These BRPs make
predictions of both their own available production capacity and their own demand and their costs (costs
and/or benefits) associated with producing and supplying energy. For achieving a better economic and/
or technical solution, energy can be sold/bought bilaterally or on day-ahead markets. Based on theirorrespondence to: P. P. J. van den Bosch, Electrical Engineering Faculty, Control Systems, PO. Box 513, 5600 MB
dhoven.
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1890 P. P. J. VAN DEN BOSCH ET AL.bids on these (future) energy markets, they can decide how much energy they will sell/buy on these
markets to create an energy balance among their production, demand, and net energy bought/sold from
the markets, in all time periods of some future time interval (e.g., the next day). Their main incentive is
to maximize profits by bidding energy contracts defined by time period, size, and price. Themarket will
decide about how much net energy has to be delivered/received from other BRPs and against which
price. These considerations are based on predicted amounts of energy and prices. Uncertainty and
disturbances are explicitly not taken into account.
This paper discusses what has to be done, from a systems point of view, to guarantee reliable and
economic operation of the power system in case of uncertainties and disturbances. Wewill focus on the
arrangements, market, and required incentives to deal with the AS that are intended for and can cope
with uncertainties in the power supply/demand and unexpected disturbances [1–6]. Although partly
different implementations exist in other countries [7], the present arrangements in The Netherlands
will be used as an example, discussed, analyzed, and commented. It will be shown that the present way
of dealing with uncertainty and disturbances is neither consistent, nor optimal and not well suited for
the challenges of the future [2,8]. A proposal is being made about market-based solutions to achieve
that goal, namely a two-sided ahead market and price-based control for AS. The paper concludes with a
consistent description of how these markets and their regulation could be organized with some final
concluding remarks about the differences compared with present-day solutions.
Notation: We assume that power P (MW) and energy E (MWh) can be both positive (production) and
negative (consumption), prosumer: end-user who can produce (producer) or consume (consumer)
electric energy.
2. PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS
A BRP is a reliable, accountable partner in the daily operation of power markets. It has to and is able to
represent its own production capacities and demands but also the production and consumption of its
prosumers (producers/consumers) which are represented by their BRP on the markets. In the
Netherlands there is an open market for energy with a market share> 20%. At the Amsterdam Power
eXchange (APX) all BRPs can trade and take care of their expected energy balance
(productionþ demandþ net import). Together with long-lasting and short bilateral contracts and
traded energy at the APX (and associated prices) they shape the E-program for the next day. The prices
at APX elucidate quite impressive dynamics with, for example, prices as low as 0.01s/MWh and up to
500 s/MWh in 1 year (2007). The Dutch TSO (TenneT) validates this E-program with respect to
constraints in the network. If any undesired overloading is being detected, this E-program is adjusted.
The costs associated with this change owing to congestion management are initially paid by the TSO
and are included in the transport tariff. The final program clearly describes the expected energy
contributions (þ/) of each BRP in each PTU (Program Time Unit of 15minutes) for the coming day.
Besides this day-ahead market a new, intraday market has been established. It allows additions to the
appointments of the APX market up to a few hours before execution. The closer to the moment of
execution, the less uncertainty and the better the prediction will be. All BRPs have to satisfy their
commitments according to the E-program. Not satisfying their commitments will introduce imbalance
costs incurred by the TSO. These imbalance costs are clear price-based incentives to comply with the
E-program as good as possible. The acquired imbalance costs are transferred to the BRPs which
contribute to the request from the TSO for support, so actively supply the needed AS.
The ahead trade is based on the amount of energy in a PTU of 15minutes. The power is measured
each 4 seconds and integrated over 15minutes. This outcome yields the energy. There are no
restrictions on the power. Any power profile is allowed as long as the contracted amount of energy,
the time integral of the power over 15minutes, is satisfied. In Figure 1 two different power profiles
are illustrated that both satisfy the required amount of energy in a PTU.
During operation, the predicted values will deviate from their real values. This is clearly true for
renewables like solar and wind, but also for loads. In a grid without control at system level any load
imbalance DP (MW) will introduce a constant frequency deviation Df¼DP/cnw (Hz) with respect to
the nominal frequency f0 (50 (Hz)), where cnw denotes the network constant owing to frequency-
dependent loads. The larger the equivalent inertia J (kgm2) in the network, the better the disturbance isCopyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
Figure 1. Power profiles satisfying the same energy requirement of a PTU.
PRICE-BASED CONTROL OF AS 1891counteracted, which follows from
f ðtÞ ¼ DPcnwDf ðtÞ
4p2Jf0
(1)
with cnw 6 103 (MW/Hz) and J 1.5 102 (M kgm2) in the interconnected European grid
(ENTSO-E interconnection). Control is the ultimate tool to cope with unpredictability and requires
signals of which both a reference and a measured value are known. Inside a synchronous (AC) power
system, the globally available frequency f and the local and interarea/cross-border power flows are
relevant signals to track the power balance.Co Tpyhe frequency is an indication of the power balance in the interconnected European grid. When
the frequency drifts away from its nominal value of 50 (Hz) it indicates a clear power imbalance. The (local) power flows yield a clear indication of power imbalance between a BRP and the grid.
The BRP will try to adjust, within the PTU, its power to re-establish its negotiated E-program. The cross-border power flows can be compared with their required values. Any deviation is an
indication for the TSO of a (national) imbalance.Basically, there are four different control actions active to deal with deviations and uncertainties
(http://www.etso-net.org).
2.1. Primary control (PC)
Each BRP and most likely several of its controllable power sources (þ/) can locally measure the
frequency f (Hz), detect any deviation Df (Hz) from the nominal frequency f0 (Hz) and adjusts their
power accordingly with control law: DP¼ cpci.Df (MW). The controller constants cpci (MW/Hz) are
negotiated values agreed upon between the TSO and the BRP. This arrangement necessitates that the
units participating in the primary control (PC) loop have to operate a certain amount from their limits.
Else, in emergency situations, the requested power is not guaranteed to be delivered in time. Owing to
the enforced PC-regulation and the uniform implementation in the interconnected grid, the sensitivity
of the grid for disturbances reduces considerably. The network constant is increased from about 6 (no
control) to about 30 (GW/Hz) (between 18 and 45). This value changes depending on the actual
participation of units and the value of their controller constants cpci (MW/Hz). As PC requirements are
not equally distributed among the BRPs, a BRP has only negative incentives to participate in PC: PC
introduces lost opportunities for earning in the energy markets; PC makes production less predictable,
more hectic and so introduces wear and less efficient operations as these units have to react quickly to
changes in the frequency; PC can enforce that the agreed energy production in a PTU will not meet its
target such that the BRP will be penalized for deviations of its agreed E-program.
Conclusion PC: As the passive stability (no control) of a grid is too low, PC is an essential ingredient to
preserve stability in case of large power imbalances.However, in theNetherlands, a BRP has no incentive
and, consequently, has to be enforced to participate in PC.The enforced participation introducedfinancial
losses. There is a monopoly in determining the size of the power needed for PC. The values of cpci are not
adjusted to the actual network topology, which could introduce not-intended overflow.A nice property of
PC is that no human interaction or global communication is necessary to activate PC. It is fully locally
measured and autonomously executed as frequency is a global property for the whole network.right # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
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The power grid is divided into several control areas, in general being defined by the national borders. The
TSO in a control area measures the cross-border power exchange. Based on this error in the interarea
power exchange (DP) and possible frequency deviation (Df), the area control error (ACE) e is calculated:
e¼DPþ csc Df (MW), where csc is a system constant of the area. Secondary control (SC) is designed to
reduce this error to zero.TheTSOutilizes a controller,whichoutputPsc (MW) indicateshow thepower set
points of theBRPs in the control area have to be changed.TheTSOutilizes a list ofBRPswho have shown
interest to participate in SC. They are permanently available or offer bids for an amount of power (MW)
with a price (s/MWh). As soon as a deviation is detected the TSO selects the cheapest bids until the
requiredPsc is satisﬁed.The last acceptedbiddetermines the price lSC (s/MWh) for all. This pricing
mechanism is called ‘‘Marginal Pricing’’. Other European countries use a different mechanism, for
example, ‘‘Pay as Bid’’. All selectedBRPs have to produce the requested power rewardedwith price
lSC.As theagreedE-programisalsoadjusted,participating in theSCdoesnot introduceapenalty. If
aBRPdoesnot satisfy thedemandedpower/energy consistently, the contractwill be reducedand/or
the TSO will neglect him next time for SC.
In general, SC requires a minimum power rate of 7% of the maximum power per minute, so in about
15minutes (one PTU) the commanded power change has to be realized. When the TSO demands an
increase of the power in the pending PTU, the BRP has only the requirement to increase its energy
output, with no statements about the power profile. So, the demanded power can be delivered more than
10minutes later than (urgently) needed.
Conclusions SC: The ENTSO-E and the TSO determine, unilaterally, the coefficient csc in the
control area error calculation and the requirements (7%/minutes), respectively. There is a single-sided
open market for BRPs to participate in the SC. The TSO has to guarantee that sufficient BRPs
participate in the SC market to guarantee sufficient liquidity. The BRPs have an incentive to participate
in the SC as participation yields financial rewards.
2.3. Tertiary control
About 15minutes after an incident, bilateral contracts can replace the effects of the SC. These contracts
are not the responsibility of the TSO. If the ACE still exists after 15minutes, the TSO will continue to
demand support from the selected BRPs. ATSO has to reduce the control area error zero, using the SC
as feedback to selected BRPs. However, this does not imply that the net energy exchange over a certain
time period across the border has satisfied its agreed values. To avoid bills for deviations, the TSO takes
care that when such a net energy error has occurred it will be compensated in a next day according to
ENTSO-E policies. As prices will not be equal, this action introduces some disturbance in the system.
2.4. Time control
At ENTSO-E level the integral of the frequency is monitored and controlled to keep grid frequency
dependent clocks synchronized. If, as a consequence of imbalances the frequency changes from 50
(Hz), these frequency deviations are integrated into a frequency error. Next, the set point of the nominal
frequency is being adjusted to reduce the average frequency error to zero. TSOs receive the frequency
reference f0 and send its value to the large BRPs. Time control is implemented in SC but the local PC
with not-adjusted values of the reference value, will always counteract this.
Emergency situations will rarely occur but if they occur it may hamper a BRP considerably. It has to
do with a trip of a large unit or parts of the grid. To cope with these disturbances is too difficult for a
BRP. For this type of situations, the grid (TSOs) may give the best solution, as it shares the risks of an
event with very low probability, but large consequences.3. CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
InFigure2, theeffectsofa loaddisturbanceDP (MW)is elucidated forfive situations:J¼ 0,cnw¼ 0;J> 0
cnw¼ 0; J, cnw> 0 and no control; J, cnw> 0with PC and J, cnw> 0with PC and SC. Initially the inertia JCopyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
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Figure 2. Effect of load disturbance DP (MW) on frequency f depending on values J, cnw and without/with
PC and/or SC control active.
PRICE-BASED CONTROL OF AS 1893constraints the rate of change of the frequency deviation, the network constant cnw andPC restrict the size
of the constant frequency deviation and, finally, SC reduces the frequency deviation back to zero.
Drawbacks of the present arrangements of AS for power imbalance are:Co PpyC is a necessary service for guaranteeing the stability of the power network. Still, it has to be
enforced and yields only negative incentives and unreasonable costs for the BRP. Only strict
enforcement by the TSO makes the PC available. The gains in PC and SC have to be dependent on the grid topology (J, cnw), the size of expected
uncertainties and the rate of load change, but they are not adjusted. SC allows the TSO to adjust the E-programs in the actual PTU of the selected BRPs. However, the
power needs not become available immediately as the BRP has only to satisfy its adjusted E-
program in the PTU. The rule that BRPs have to satisfy their negotiated energy within a period of 15minutes is too
coarse. It will not help to stabilize the grid as the power can fluctuate considerably without
violating any regulation. At the transition between PTUs, there are too many, often conflicting, control signals active that
influence the power balance: the necessity to control the demanded E-program in the PTU, and the
actions arising from the PC and SC. The net effect is that up to 70% of the PC reserve capacity is
used for this purpose, reducing this precious PC capacity for emergency situations to 30% of its
intended value [9].The effects of these drawbacks on the stability of the power balance cannot be predicted. It can
introduce unwanted oscillations and even instability.4. NEW CHALLENGES
The power system and energy markets will change in the future and so regulation has to adapt to new
technological, societal and economic developments: The synchronous grid will increase in size and complexity. With more generators and rotating
loads the network constant cnw and J will increase. This is a positive development. Power-
controlled DC-lines do contribute neither to cnw nor to J. The grid will be used evermore for economic operation. That implies that quite some cross-border
tie-lines are loaded up to their maximum. When they are at their maximum capacity, no control
(emergency) power can be used from far away. Consequently, only that part of the grid connected
with the area of the disturbance by unconstrained lines can contribute to deliver the needed power
shortage [4,5]. By sacrificing some economic profits, sufficient spare capacity must be allocated
on the relevant cross-border connections. Although the grid size increases, the physical connections (tie-line system) still pose a constraint
on the allowed power flows. As a consequence, there will always be an upper limit for the amountright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
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AS [3–5]. A considerable penetration of renewables is to be expected. Present policy is to increase to 30%
wind and solar energy, which will introduce larger uncertainties and more demanding arrange-
ments for AS. Many units become connected by power-electronic converters to the grid. As a consequence these
generators and loads become purposely insensitive for the actual frequency and voltages of the
network. The demanded or supplied power is realized, in spite of changing variables in the grid.
That decreases the network constant cnw and the equivalent inertia of the network, resulting in less
passive stability. When all loads and producers are connected by a power-controlled converter to
the grid, so the network J and cnw disappear, any passive safety margin is being removed, making
the network extremely susceptible for disturbances, as elucidated in Figure 3. The dynamics of technical devices, control loops and market are starting to overlap, introducing
unexpected and unintended ‘‘stability’’ problems, as elucidated at the end of a PTU with large
frequency deviations of up to 150mHz within a time frame of 10minutes [9].All, except the first, arguments will increase the sensitivity of the frequency f(t) for uncertainties and
disturbances.5. NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANCILLARY SERVICES
Required are incentives and rules to guarantee both a reliable and a stable power system in spite of
technological, economic and societal changes, competing BRPs, and cross-border trade. They have to
guarantee low prices, high reliability, low sensitivity to the large uncertainties of renewables, low
sensitivity to large, unexpected disturbances, and sufficient incentives for upgrading the grid and the
production capacity for future operations. This generic goal is not the natural aim of prosumers, neither
of BRPs and even not of a TSO with respect to future situations. Nobody cares directly about the
integrity of the power system on the long run. Still that goal has to be achieved to the benefit of all.
It is important to note that, although the TSO could have better estimates of uncertainties in the
system (and therefore for the global AS needs) as it benefits more from the aggregation effects, the
BRPs have more knowledge and more incentives for this estimation. These incentives include their
desire for improving its time-varying uncertainty estimates as well as finding the optimal trade-offs
between reliability and direct economic benefits. Therefore, we propose, as additions to the already
existing ahead markets (PX) for energy, a new AS market which is open, transparent with sufficientFigure 3. The price-based control concept.
right # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
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power system. The AS market is an ahead market to cope with expected uncertainties before operation.
The quantities traded are options (MWh) to deliver energy within some time interval when needed.
They can, but in general will not, be called into operation. With an AS market BRPs assess their own
uncertainties and liabilities. They define their own reserve needs for the expected uncertainties in their
production or demand. Any expected/predicted excess or deficit can be traded on the AS market. If the
AS market yields a cheaper solution compared with its own solution (e.g., switchable or adjustable
loads), the BRP can select the market. It is a necessity that the price at the power exchange is lower than
the price at the AS market, which, in turn, has to be lower than the expected price incurred by the TSO
for detected imbalances. Consequently, the BRPs have a clear incentive to take care of their own
uncertainties instead of relying on the more expensive imbalance arrangements.
Our approach is enabled by ICT technologies and by utilizing decentralized and distributed control
systems theory and modern optimization techniques. It deals with the increasing overlap between the
dynamics of the interconnected physical power system (Figure 3C,D), with time varying power
requirements as prominent signals and the economical layer (Figure 3A,B) with time varying price
signals as the prominent information carriers.
Our goal is to design efficient control schemes for coordination and time synchronization of BRPs
actions. These schemes have to guarantee that the overall system benefits are maximized while the
crucial global constraints on efficiency and reliability, for example power balance, transmission system
power flow constraints, stability, and reliability related constraints, are satisfied. The overall system
objective is to maximize its economical benefit: the sum of benefits of all involved BRPs in the system.
Satisfaction of global constraints is not a natural goal of BRPs. By introducing the prices for global
constraints, the overall system optimization problem is decomposed into set of problems, each
assigned to one BRP. Using prices to coordinate local objectives, crucial global constraints can be
optimally satisfied. Solving the global optimization problem through decomposition and price-based
coordination of BRPs is schematically illustrated in Figure 3.
It is widely recognized that the price inelasticity of the demand is one of the biggest flaws of
current electrical energy markets [1]. For example, adequate modeling and thorough mathematical
analysis presents firm theoretical justification for the policy to install ‘‘smart meters’’ enabling
demand-side matching by price-based control, which helps consumers control their demand for
power in response to evolving prices [10]. Price-based control has been proposed earlier, e.g., in
Ref. [11,15]. Past years we have generalized these approaches to distributed and real-time
implementations which can cope with only local information and hard transmission constraints and
so yield zonal prices [12,13].
Based on this global concept, this paper focuses on an ahead AS market [1,2,6,8] for reliably and
efficiently making available and supplying energy when demanded by the TSO.5.1. AS market
Each BRP has to define its own expected production E
p
k (MWh) (including negotiated imports) and
consumption Eck (MWh) (including negotiated export) of energy for each considered PTUk. The
expected difference Ek (MWh) (E
p
k þ Eck þ Ek ¼ 0) has to be assured by trading on the energy market
(PX). However, both quantities E
p
k and E
c
k are associated with uncertainties. This uncertainty can, for
example, be expressed by using so-called probability density functions (pdf) of both E
p
k and E
c
k, which
express the probability that E
p
k and E
c
k have a certain value. The mean values will be partly a function of
the price l (s/MWh): the higher the price, the higher the estimated production and the lower the
expected demand. By combining the pdfs of both E
p
k and E
c
k, the pdf of Ek can be constructed or
estimated. In Figure 4 an example of such a pdf is elucidated. Given such a pdf the BRP has to decide
which deterministic bid curve for Ek(l) he has to offer to the power exchange and to which risks the
BRP will be exposed as, in general, the value of Ek will not coincide with the agreed value E
PX
k . Not
satisfying the agreed energy EPXk will result in costs incurred by the TSO.We distinguish between costs
as a consequence of an agreed maximum size of the imbalance on the AS market, billed with the AS
price, and the non-predicted imbalance, billed with the imbalance price. A BRP has several
possibilities to avoid imbalance costs:Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
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Figure 4. pdf of Ek, and selection R
þ
k and R

k .
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1896 P. P. J. VAN DEN BOSCH ET AL. apyctively controlling its own production E
p
k and/or consumption E
c
k to keep E
PX
k þ Epk þ Eck ¼ 0  better predictions of Ek lPXk , depending on the expected price lPXk at the power exchange buying options on the AS market for a maximum energy imbalance in a PTU at lower expected
prices than the imbalance price.As an open and transparent market will offer the required amount of energy at at least the same, but
in general at a better price, participating in the AS market is beneficial, compared with own
arrangements for AS. We distinguish two situations (ASþ, AS). In each situation a BRP is requesting
(R) AS, is supplying (S) them or is passive. A request R is expressed as a maximum amount of energy
(MWh): Rþk ½MWh is the maximum amount of surplus energy and Rk ½MWh the maximum amount of
shortage energy that a BRP will try to compensate by trading on the ahead AS market. The decision
about these values Rþk and R

k can be taken based on the pdf of Ek, the expected prices at the AS market
l
ASþ=
k and the expected imbalance price l
imb
k , as elucidated in Figure 4. In selecting R
þ
k ¼ Rk ¼ 0, so
being passive at the AS market, all deviations DEk ¼ EkEPXk from the agreed EPXk have to be paid
based on the price at the imbalance market. With finite values of both Rþk and R

k , deviationsDEk within
the interval Rk < DEk < Rþk have to be paid based on the AS market prices lASþ=k and for DEk
outside this interval the imbalance market price limbk will be incurred. The price l
ASþ
k is used when
there is a request to absorb too much energy, and lASk when there is a request to deliver energy. Using
the pdf of DEk, the expected costs can be calculated. A proper choice of both R
þ
k and/or R

k reduces or
evenminimizes these expected costs. Based on these insights the BRP can make, for each PTUk, proper
selections for his bid curve lPXk ðEÞ and, based on the clearing of the PX {lPXk , EPXk }, the two bid curves
lASþk ðRÞ and lASk ðRÞ and the amounts Rþk and Rk . These bid curves are decreasing function lASþk ðRÞ
and lASk ðRÞ. The prices reflect the maximum affordable price for buying AS when needed. If the
market price l
ASþ=
k ðRÞ is higher, own alternatives have to be found, as the market is not willing to
supply the required services for the stated maximum price. If the market price l
ASþ=
k ðRÞ is lower, the
market offers a cheaper solution than own alternatives. The selection of appropriate values for EPXk , R
þ
k
or Rk is a trade-off between probabilities. By asking a fee from BRPs requesting AS and paying BRPs
prepared to supply ASwhen asked by the TSO, transparent behavior is being supported. Just requesting
large amounts of AS to avoid high cost when imbalance energy is needed, is therefore financially not a
recommended strategy. The costs for just requesting AS can be formulated, for example, as crR
þ=
K ½
with cr (s/MWh)> 0.
A market not only needs demand (request) for AS, but also BRPs offering (supplying) AS. BRPs
which have easily controllable or price-sensitive power and/or loads, can offer their excess capacity at
the AS market. They can make a profit from their ability to quickly supply (S) energy when needed by
unexpected requests (R) from the TSO when an imbalance occurs in a control area. The AS supplying
BRPs can offer in each PTU their bid curves lASþk ðSÞ and lASþk ðSÞ ½=MWh and the maximum amounts
Sþ and S (MWh). The bid curve will be increasing functions of S. The prices reflect the minimum
price lASþðSÞ ½=MWh for which the required option S (MWh) will be made available when
demanded. When the market price lASþðSÞ is lower, the BRP is not willing to supply the desired
quantity of AS. At the AS market the aggregated bid curves are added, both for the ASþ-market
(request for absorbing energy: R too much energy, S: offers to absorb this energy when needed) and for
the AS-market (request for additional energy: R shortage of energy, S: offers to deliver this energy
when needed). For each PTUk, separately for the AS
þ and AS-market, prices lASþk and l
AS
k areright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
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þ
i;k; R

i;k; S
þ
i;k; S

i;k) such that there is a balance between the
requested (Ri,k) and supplied (Si,k) AS of all BRPi for all PTUk:
lASþk ¼ argl
X
i
½Rþi;kðlÞSi;kðlÞ ¼ 0
n o
(2)
lASk ¼ argl
X
i
½Ri;kðlÞSþi;kðlÞ ¼ 0
n o
(3)
5.2. AS market financial incentives
The buyer of the AS has to pay the agreed price (lASþk or l
AS
k ) and the seller will receive when AS is
requested by the TSO. A unique market solution necessitates that the aggregated monotonously non-
increasing curve lASþk ðR=SÞ crosses the monotonously non-decreasing aggregated curve lASk ðR=SÞ.
With the market clearing prices there are unique combinations of BRPs which agree to prosume their
offered bid when needed. When the deviations of R and/or S are outside the agreed values of the AS-
market, the TSOwill ask for imbalance power with price limbk ½=MWh. A necessary requirement for the
expected prices will be: lPXk < l
ASþ=
k < l
imb
k with, within a BRP, the marginal production costs
l
p
k ½=MWh < lPXk and the marginal consumption costs lck ½=MWh < lPXk . These price dependencies
are illustrated in Figure 5. Just like BRPs requesting AS have to pay fixed costs, BRPs supplying AS
will receive a financial reward for making AS available when needed, for example, as csS
þ=
K ½ with cs
(s/MWh)> 0.
Now, the financial consequences for a BRP can be calculated. For example, if a BRP consumes too
much (Ek < E
PX
k Rk ) in PTUk, the following items can be distinguished:Co PpyX: commitment at the power exchange: EPXk l
PX
k AS-market: fixed costs in the AS market, cr(Rk þ Rþk ) cs(Sk þ Sþk )
 TSO: costs owing to the AS market, using the maximum reserved AS energy Rk : Rk lASk
 TSO: costs owing to having imbalance: (ðEPXk Rk EkÞlimbk
The first amount is being paid at the PX, the second part at the AS-market for reserving when
needed/supplying when asked for of AS energy, the third part to the TSO for utilizing contracted AS
energy in PTUk outside the agreed amount E
PX
k to a maximum R

k . The fourth contribution is owing to
utilizing non-negotiated imbalance energy. As the BRP also earns money by selling the contracted
energy Eck with price l
c
k to its consumers, and by paying for the energy E
p
k with price l
p
k bought from its
producers, its profit f
profit
k ½ becomes (E can be positive and negative)
f
profit
k ¼ Ecklck þ Epklpk þ EPXk lPXk crðRk þ Rþk Þ þ csðSk þ Sþk ÞRk lASk ðEkEPXk Rk Þlimbk
The maximum profit is achieved when Ek¼EPXk , some less profit when the deviations are agreed on
in the AS-market (Rk  EkEPXk  Rþk ) and considerable less when the deviations are exceeding the
estimated and agreed values of Rþk and R

k , as illustrated in Figure 6, for a net-producing BRP with tooFigure 5. Dependencies among expected prices: l
p
k < l
PX
k < l
C
k < l
ASþ=
k < l
imb
k .
right # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
Figure 6. BRP net-producer, costs f if AS needed, f
profit
k maximum if Ek ¼ EPXk .
1898 P. P. J. VAN DEN BOSCH ET AL.much energy (request for AS). In Figure 7 a net-consuming BRP which can supply (S) AS is illustrated.
Without request from the TSO, its maximum profit is achieved when Ek ¼ EPXk . When the TSO asks
this BRP to supply AS and/or imbalance energy, its profits will increase.
5.3. AS market reliability
Both Figure 6 and Figure 7 elucidate that the proposed market arrangements yield true financial
incentives for maintaining the agreed prosumption of both the PX- and AS-markets. Yet, there are also
incentives to request AS to avoid the higher and yet unknown prices for imbalance and to supply
imbalance power when requested by the TSO. The AS market solutions (2) and (3) imply that the
reliability, guaranteeing sufficient AS when needed, is assured in each PTUk by the inequality
Pi Sþi;k lASk
  Pi Rþi;k lASþk
 Pi Ri;k lASk
  Pi Si;k lASþk
 
. Only when all AS requests are
fully correlated (either
P
i R
þ
i;k l
ASþ
k
  ¼ 0 or Pi Ri;k lASk
  ¼ 0), the equal signs are active. In all
other situations, the inequalities are valid. When the uncertainties of the BRPs are uncorrelated, soP
i R
þ
i;k l
ASþ
k
 Pi Ri;k lASk
   0, almost no power imbalance will be visible in the power net with
few demands for AS. Consequently, in daily operation, the amount of available AS for supply (S) is
almost always larger and only sometimes equal than the amount of requested AS (R). When the TSOFigure 7. BRP net consumer, supplying AS and imbalance energy when asked by TSO.
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PRICE-BASED CONTROL OF AS 1899needs AS energy in PTUk, all BRPs that have been prepared to supply AS energy in that PTU for agreed
price l
ASþ=
k , are requested to adjust their E-programs proportional to their agreed maximum
Sþ= lASþ=k
 
. Consequently, the contribution of the demanded AS is distributed among all
participating BRPs, and not, like now, the BRPwith the lowest bid on a bid ladder. All BRPs can benefit
according to their agreed share in the AS market.5.4. AS market tuning by TSO
By selecting an appropriate value for both cr and cs the TSO can influence the AS market. Low values
for cr will invite many BRPs to request more than to supply AS, with high values cs less AS will be
requested and more offered to supply, so influencing both the liquidity and the price lAS at the AS
market. If appropriate, these coefficients cr/cs can be made PTUk (k) dependent and/or price-
dependent. To further improve responsible behavior of BRPs the fixed amount cs Sk (s) is only being
(partially) paid when a BRP (partially) satisﬁes the demand for AS by the TSO. For example,
when Sdk extra energy in PTUk is being demanded and only Sk delivered, the proﬁts of offering and
supplying AS will be SkðlASk lpkÞjSk-Sdkjlimbk þminuteððSk=Sdk; 1ÞcsSþk ½.
The reliability can be further improved, without more involvement of the TSO, when the TSO
decides to require only imbalance costs when a BRP is operating outside its agreed region
(Rk < DEk < Rþk ) and contributes to the imbalance. Other BRPs outside their agreed region
contribute in counteracting the imbalance, so did not need a negative incentive. As both the sign of the
imbalance and the value of the imbalance price (which can be large [too few power] or small [too much
power]) are not known in advance, BRPs have strong incentives to keep their own imbalance within the
agreed region (Rk < DEk < Rþk ), reducing the need for imbalance energy.5.5. AS market replacing secundary control (SC)
With the proposed ASmarket and sufficient BRPs participating, this market mechanism can replace the
present arrangements for SC. Each BRP has to assess its own needs and options for AS. A BRP can
profitably reduce its risks and costs by buying AS at the AS market. Then the power net is used to
supply the needed AS cheaper than by own prosumption and the uncertain, higher imbalance costs are
avoided. There are consistent financial incentives for correctly estimating and trading the needs for AS.
Both too high and too low estimates introduce additional costs. Owing to the two-sided market lower
costs are to be expected, yet there are sufficient incentives to guarantee a required energy and power
balance. The TSO is also active at the AS market requesting AS (R) for guaranteeing the control areas
requirements on frequency, cross-border power deviations and emergency situations, but the majority
of AS is traded among the BRPs. The TSO can consider the AS market to reserve or contract (part) of
its needed emergency power for rare incidents with a high impact, although separate arrangements for
these rare situations can be considered.
Network constraints introduce one-sided restrictions for AS. So, the AS are not uniformly
distributed among the network, but discretely different. Also nodal or zonal pricing is needed when
network restrictions occur [4–6].5.6. Outlook for primary control (PC)
SC is demanded by the TSO to make energy available within a PTU. Consequently, it can take a
maximum of 15minutes before the required energy has been produced. For faster adjustments, PC is
required. PC is a necessary commodity that can react autonomously without interaction by the TSO.
The paper elucidates that PC has to be enforced, can even introduce imbalance costs and is not paid for.
So, only negative incentives for BRPs. In Ref. [2–4] it is shown that real-time, price-based control is a
realistic option and can replace PC. BRPs have proper and consistent financial incentives to make
economic viable decisions about power and AS. A real-time price signal limb(t), determined by the
TSO each point in time t and not known in advance, gives BRPs financial incentives to adjust their
prosumption immediately. Together with the proposed ahead ASmarket they guarantee a cost-effective
and reliable solution for the AS [2,4,8]. The theory presented in Ref. [8,14] has the capability forCopyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
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among countries.
It can even be argued, that with an appropriate, reliable and fast ICT infrastructure and real-
time price sensitive BRPs, an arrangement with only real-time, price-based control, both
the ahead PX and AS markets can be avoided. The TSO-determined price will fluctuate
instantaneously and unpredictably according to the actual power and energy balance of the power
net, relying on the price-sensitivity of the majority of prosumers. Still, price-sensitivity is not yet
achieved, neither commercially, nor technically. We consider such an arrangement, at this moment
in time, not yet feasible. The PX and AS markets give predictability, reliability, and transparent
prices, reducing risks. These prices are proper guidelines for all participants in the power net.
Cross-border trade and constraints in the power network are easier to predict and corrected now
by the TSOs.6. CONCLUSION
It is shown that the present arrangements for maintaining a power and energy balance in power
networks are based on insufficient and inconsistent incentives for BRPs and TSOs to behave in such a
way that a reliable and economic future power system is guaranteed. The introduction of a market for
AS enforces that the estimation of the size of these services is determined by the BRPs themselves. The
BRP itself takes the decision to distribute optimally its resources among the ahead energy and the
proposed ahead AS market. Price mechanisms for AS have been designed in such a way that the
collective action of all BRPs in maximizing their own profits will realize the global goals of power
balance, efficiency, and reliability of the power system. The proposed AS market guarantees a cost-
effective and reliable solution for AS for SC. A power system equipped with this AS market is well
prepared for the many challenging new developments in the near future.7. LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
7.1. Symbolsl PCopyrigrice (s/MWh)
cnw Network constant (MW/Hz)cpc PC constant (MW/Hz)csc SC constant (MW/Hz)f Frequency (Hz)P Power (MW)R AS request (MWh)S AS supply (MWh)7.2. AbbreviationsAS ahncillary serviceBRP balance responsible partnerPTU program time unitPC primary controlPX power exchangeSC secondary controlACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We appreciate the stimulating and rewarding discussions in the EOS RegelDuurzaam research project.t # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
PRICE-BASED CONTROL OF AS 1901REFERENCES
1. Stoft S. Power system economics: designing markets for electricity, IEEE/Wiley: New York, 2002.
2. Alvarado FL, Meng J, DeMarco CL, Mota WS. Stability analysis of interconnected power systems with market
dynamics. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2001; 16(4): 695–701.
3. Alvarado FL. Understanding Locational Reserves and Reliability Needs in Electricity Markets, Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, USA, 2006.
4. Jokic A, Lazar M, van den Bosch PPJ. Real-Time Control of Power Systems Using Nodal Prices, 16th Power
Systems Computation Conference (PSCC 2008), Glasgow, UK, July 2008.
5. Christie RD, Wollenberg BF, Wangensteen I. Transmission management in the deregulated environment.
Proceedings of the IEEE 2000; 88(2): 170–195.
6. Frunt J, Jokic A, Kling WL, Myrzik JMA, van den Bosch PPJ. Provision of Ancillary Services for Balance
Management in Autonomous Networks, 5th International Conference on the European Electricity Market, Lisbon,
Portugal, May 2008.
7. Rebours Y, Kirschen D, TrotignonM, Rossignol S. A survey of frequency and voltage control ancillary services–part
II: economic features. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2007; 22: 358–366.
8. Jokic A. Price-based Optimal Control of Electrical Power Systems, PhD thesis, Eindhoven University of Technology,
Eindhoven, The Netherlands, 2007.
9. Tractabel Engineering, Study of the Interaction and Dependencies of Balancing Markets, Intraday Trade and
Automatically Activated Reserves, February 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/, studies/doc/
electricity/2009_balancing_markets.pdf.
10. Cho I-K, Meyn SP. Dynamics of Ancillary Service Prices in Power Distribution Systems, Proceedings of the
42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, (USA), 2003.
11. Harris C. Electricity markets: pricing, structures and economics. John Wiley: New York, 2006.
12. Jokic A, Hermans RM, Lazar M, van den Bosch PPJ. Distributed, price-based control approach to market-based
operation of future power systems, Proceedings 6th International Conference on the European Electricity Market,
Leuven, May 2009.
13. Damoiseaux ACRM, Jokic A, Lazar M, Alessio A, van den Bosch PPJ, Hiskens I, Bemporad A. Assessment of
Decentralized Model Predictive Control Techniques for Power Networks, Proceedings of the 16th Power Systems
Computation Conference (PSCC 2008), Glasgow (UK), July 2008.
14. Jokic A, Lazar M. On Decentralized Stabilisation of Discrete-time Nonlinear Systems, Proceedings IEEE American
Control Conference, pp. 5777–5782, St. Louis, 2009.
15. DeMarco CL. ControlStructures for Competitive, Market-driven Power Systems, IEEE Conference on Decision, and
Control, 2001.Copyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Euro. Trans. Electr. Power 2011;21:1889–1901
DOI: 10.1002/etep
